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Tim Cook 
Sixty thousand Canadians were killed by shell, bullet and poison gas, among other horrors 
in the Great War from 1915-1918. By the 
Armistice, roughly one in every nine Canadians 
who served in France had been killed. The terrible 
carnage of the First World War remains 
associated with the major battles which have 
become the pegs by which the conflict is 
measured: the 2nd Battle of Ypres in 1915; St. 
Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the Somme in 1916; Vimy 
Ridge, Hill 70 and Passchendaele in 1917; and 
finally, the March offensive and the string of 
operations making up the Last 100 Days in 1918. 
But between these great conflagrations, which 
lasted between three days and three months, 
there raged hundreds of tiny engagements. For 
instance, of the 62,315 Canadian casualties in 
1917, a full one-third of them came from the 
wastage associated with the on-going trench 
warfare, as opposed to the major delineated 
ba t t l e s of Vimy Ridge, Hill 70, and 
Passchendaele.1 Of those 20,000 casualties, a 
good portion of them were suffered by soldiers 
stumbling their way through the trials of trench 
warfare until they were blasted out of existence 
by shells they could not see or fight back against. 
Yet to helplessly cower in their holes and be 
bombed day in and day out was both physically 
and mentally destructive. As a result, the trench 
soldiers and their commanders adapted to their 
circumstance and fought back by trench raiding, 
an activity which allowed soldiers to strike 
against the enemy and thereby ease the 
psychological burden of stewing in a trench 
waiting for the shell with their name on it. Putting 
oneself in harm's way in order to alleviate the 
strain of war may seem a strange contradiction, 
but such raiding helped the soldier cope with his 
absurd predicament. 
The writing of Canadian First World War 
military history has been largely whiggish in 
nature: a success story where Canadian lads, 
after a few hard knocks, repeatedly beat back 
the Germans at their own game. Charles Stacey, 
the doyen of Canadian military history, even 
Top: Canadian troops train with gas masks. 
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remarked that the creation of the Canadian 
Corps was the greatest thing that Canada has 
ever done.2 Heady words, indeed. Accordingly, 
the corps' successes have generally been 
emphasized over its failures. And inseparable 
from those victories was the positive 
contributions of the Canadian generals. In 
contrast, British commanders have generally 
been condemned for their perceived costly and 
sacrificial failures. Incompetence, rigidity, and 
a failure to adapt to the new realities of warfare 
have led a school of historians to remark that 
the British troops were "lions led by donkeys."3 
two exceptional corps commanders, Julian 
Byng (May 1916 to June 1917) and Arthur 
Currie (June 1917 to the end of the war).6 
Behind the easily identifiable commanders 
s tand their subordina tes , the dedicated, 
professional staff officers. All Canadian 
generals relied heavily on these trained officers, 
who effectively analyzed, coordinated, and 
planned operations. And for most of the war, 
almost all of the senior staff positions were filled 
by very competent British regular officers. The 
success of the Canadian Corps in the First 
World War in large m e a s u r e shou ld be 
attributed to this crucial British support. Yet, 
i t is still worth examining C a n a d i a n 
commanders and policies, rather than simply 
declaring them a breed apart from their British 
colleagues. Mistakes were made and the history 
of the Canadian Corps was not one of sweeping 
successes; it was, rather, one of learning from 
mistakes and making sure they did not happen 
again.7 This article will probe one such incident: 
the March 1917 gas raid on Vimy Ridge. This 
study will not only illuminate one aspect of the 
history of the Canadian Corps, but will also 
offer more general observations on the concept 
of raiding and the nature of gas warfare. 
Left: Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th 
Canadian Division. 
Below: Colonel Edmund Ironside, GSO 1, 4th 
Canadian Division, with his dog Gibby. 
Some Canadian divisional commanders like 
Archibald Macdonell, Henry Burstall, L.J. 
Lipsett, and Raymond Brutinel4 were indeed 
sharper and better able to understand and 
react to the static nature of the fighting than 
most of their British counterparts. It should 
be remembered, however, that Canadian 
commanders were not initially without their 
faults, and throughout the war there was a 
progressive learning experience. In the process 
there were those who did not measure up to 
the task of a battlefield command, such as 
Richard Turner, commander of the 1st Brigade 
and then 2nd Division, who won a Victoria 
Cross during the Boer War and whose bravery 
was never called into question even when his 
competence was.3 Despite the mixture of 
generals, the Canadian Corps was gifted with 
8 
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This article will offer a case s tudy to 
understand better the Canadian policy of raiding; 
piece together the fragmented narrative of the 
raid itself, which has previously been examined 
without a proper understanding of the integral 
component of poison gas; and attempt to 
analyze why the raid was such a failure. 
Unrealistic expectations, a break-down in 
command, an absence of doctrine, and most 
importantly, the inability of staff officers to 
understand and adequately employ poison gas, 
culminated in the most self-destructive 
Canadian raid of the war. The interplay of 
technology and soldiers is a tenuous subject, 
but it is the key to understanding the failure 
of the Gas Raid of 1 March 1917. 
After losing 24,000 casualties in the grisly fighting on the Somme, the Canadian Corps 
under the command of Sir Julian Byng turned 
in the winter of 1916-1917 to rebuilding its 
shattered battalions and integrating new troops 
into the formations. Despite their losses, and 
during this period of recuperation, the Canadians 
continued to harass the German lines by trench 
raids. Long had the Canadians been regarded by 
the British as elite soldiers and their refinement 
of trench raiding in the last month of 1915 had 
led Sir Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the 
British Expeditionary Force, to congratulate the 
colonials for their skill and elan.11 
The Canadians transformed trench raiding 
to a deadly art, which wore away at the enemy's 
morale and strength as he was kept taut and 
nervous whenever opposite the "wild colonials."12 
The raids were conducted in the dead of night 
and centred on the principle of destroy and 
retreat. They were not meant for holding ground 
in the enemy trench, simply to wreak havoc. The 
chaos of night fighting, false attacks and barrages 
up and down the enemy front line, disrupted 
communications, and the inherent confusion of 
ascertaining where the exact attack was being 
launched, left the defenders momentarily 
vulnerable. Yet trench raiding was not without 
its costs and the intricate plans could degenerate 
into mad, vicious battles with high casualties to 
both sides. Casualties notwithstanding, the 
success of the Canadians in winning control 
of no-man's-land, as well as recognition in the 
language of the trenches as "fire-eaters," 
9 
The Canadian Corps' youngest and final division, the 4th, arrived in France in 
August, 1916. Commanded by David Watson, 
a newspaper editor prior to the war, who had 
worked his way up from command of the 2nd 
Battalion, and then the 5th Brigade, until he 
was finally given his division. Holding down the 
most important staff officer position (GSO 1) 
was Edmund Ironside, the man who was in 
charge of planning operations. Imposing at six 
foot four inches, he spoke seven languages and 
was "supremely self-confident, forceful and 
opinionated."8 Nicknamed "Tiny," he brought 
years of experience to the young division for its 
first trial by fire. Under Watson and Ironside, the 
4th Division acquitted itself well during the 
bloody fighting on the Somme in November 1916. 
After the first three Canadian divisions were 
rotated out of that sector after severe attritional 
grinding, the 4th Division captured Regina 
Trench . Notwi ths tanding tha t the once 
formidable Regina Trench, with its bristling 
barbed wire barriers, fortified trenches and inter-
locking machine gun nests, had been blasted out 
of existence by the Canadian artillery, the soldiers 
of the 4th Division showed that they could fight 
alongside their more experienced countrymen, 
and with 4,311 casualties, die like Canadians 
too.9 
Following the fierce fighting on the Somme 
the 4th Division joined the Canadian Corps on a 
quieter front. Not content to sit back, the 
Canadians actively raided the German lines, 
causing casualties and eroding the German 
morale. Taking pride in winning control of no-
man's-land, the Canadians began to not only 
compete among themselves but with other units 
for the biggest bag of prisoners or the most 
destruction wrought.10 The policy of raiding 
began to spiral out of control and the 4th Division 
was not immune to the informal rivalry. In fact 
to distinguish itself, the 4th Division planned the 
largest Canadian raid of the war, a 1,600-man 
attack behind a poison gas cloud against the 
heights of Vimy Ridge. Actually, it was to be more 
of a clean up and reconnaissance, for the raiders 
were told that the gas would wipe out the enemy 
and their role would centre on destroying a few 
dugouts and gathering information from the 
dead. The result was very different and the 
subsequent butchery nearly crippled the 4th 
Division as an effective fighting formation 
before its major assault on Vimy Ridge. 
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bombardments to fall behind your trenches. 
This arrangement of complicated truces was 
of course not conducive to winning the war; 
one historian has remarked that close to one-
third of the British units attempted to set up 
this "live and let live" system when they went 
into the lines.13 The main deterrent was an 
enemy who refused to follow the rules. The 
Canadians were known to do just that, and in 
the four months prior to the formal Battle of 
Vimy Ridge in April 1917 they launched at least 
55 raids.14 With an already established elite 
reputation, the Canadians were generally not 
interested in playing games so they might stay 
forever in the rat-infested ditches they called 
trenches.15 
The most likely victims for the raiders were 
the unfortunate sentries who kept watch in the 
listening posts in front of the enemy lines. An 
unenviable posting at the best of times, the 
listeners had to contend with their own fears, 
the surreal landscape of no-man's-land at night, 
and, most of all, the fact that there were trained 
killers lurking amongst the bodies and shellholes 
ready to snatch or dispatch them. For Battalion 
or Brigade commanders, the aim of the raids was 
to hit back at the enemy, keep him apprehensive, 
exert control over no-man's- land, gather 
information on what units were opposite, look 
for any new fortifications or gas canister 
emplacements, and of course, kill the enemy. 
Higher commands viewed raiding as keeping the 
soldiers active and battle-hardened as well as, 
among other things, destroying the live and let 
live system. There could be no informal truces 
where soldiers were actively hunting each other 
in no-man's-land; few men would sleep soundly 
at the front. 
The wearing-down process was part ly accomplished through harassment by 
poison gas. By 1917, the Canadians had been 
subjected to several gas cloud attacks from the 
Germans. The most famous and lethal was the 
second chlorine gas attack of the war on 24 April 
1915 during the 2nd Battle of Ypres. The 
Germans had unleashed their new weapon two 
days earlier against two French colonial and 
territorial divisions to the north of the Canadian 
line and had completely routed them, leaving a 
mile long gap which the German infantry flowed 
into. The raw and untried men of the 1st 
further pressed their commanders to organize 
larger more innovative assaults. 
After a series of daring raids, the 4th 
Division planned a larger and riskier operation 
t h a n any th ing carr ied out by its more 
experienced corps companions. It was to be 
launched against the heights of Vimy Ridge, a 
position which dominated Canadian lines and 
included the unmarked graves of thousands 
of Frenchmen from two previous failed but 
more formal assaul t s . As a result of the 
par t icular ly s t rong position held by the 
Germans on top of the ridge, the planners 
decided that poison gas would be employed to 
suffocate the dug-in garrison. Components of 
four battalions would raid the enemy lines. This 
policy of raiding was not born in a vacuum, 
however, and there was a gradual evolution 
culminating in the massive chemical raid. 
The solidifying of the Western Front and 
the resulting trench warfare had rendered 
soldiers unab l e to s t r ike back at their 
tormentors, the enemy artillery. No sweeping 
flank attacks or daring bayonet charges were 
possible, and the infantryman was forced to 
eek out an existence as he held his fortified 
ditch against possible enemy attacks. While 
statically defending the front, the soldiers made 
excellent targets and there was continuous 
wastage - eveything from snipers picking off 
exposed sentries, stray shells caving in dugouts 
or gas discharges burning out men's lungs. The 
same was occurring on the other side of no-
man's-land, and it was this policy of attrition 
which Sir Douglas Haig regarded as useful in 
grinding down the enemy's forces. The soldiers 
were not always happy to comply and the 
necessary attrition threatened to dwindle away 
in some of the quiet sectors where the infantry 
were not willing to "waste" themselves against 
the enemy. 
In those areas loomed the hard reality, at least 
to Haig, of the phrase: "live and let live." Opposing 
units, often within a hundred yards of each other, 
could choose not to bomb, shoot and otherwise 
actively seek out the death of the enemy if he 
chose in turn to do the same. It was based on a 
series of implied codes which each side worked 
out by a system of retribution and reward. For 
instance, if one battalion bombed heavily, the 
other called down a massive barrage on their 
lines; leave us alone, and we'll instruct the 
10 
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to the highest field marshal were vehemently 
opposed to the use of chemicals to suffocate 
men who had no chance of defending 
themselves. It was contrary to the rules of war 
as set out at the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907, but more importantly, it was counter 
to the perceived notion of how war should be 
fought. War had been envisioned as a great 
game, where the young men of Europe would 
come into their own on the battlefield and the 
decadence of modern society would be purged. 
Such notions, had, of course, already been 
blasted out of the soldiers at the front by the 
more than one million dead at this point in the 
war, but gas was still seen by many as simply 
too much. The frantic scramble to devise some 
form of protection resulted in a series of gas 
masks that initially offered more psychological 
than physical protection. All the while, the 
advanced state of the German chemical plants 
supplied the army with vast stores of chlorine 
and later - eight times more lethal - phosgene 
gas, in the hope of ending the deadlock of the 
t r enches . When the Bri t i sh began to 
manufacture their own gas in mid-1915, the 
battlefield was quickly deluged in chemical 
agents. 
The Canadians were gassed several more 
times with chlorine and, after 19 December 
1915, phosgene. More debilitating, they began 
to fall victim to German gas shells in mid-1916, 
as opposed to earlier and less reliable and 
accurate gas released from buried canisters. 
During the battle of the Somme which raged 
from July to November 1916, both sides 
employed gas in greater amoun t s , more 
frequently and to accomplish a variety of 
tactical applications. Counter-battery work, the 
disruption of the lines of communication and 
forming up points, and the harassment of 
soldiers and animals were all accomplished by 
gas shells. Even with these new roles, there 
remained, however, a shortage of gas shells in 
the BEF (the Canadian Corps did not receive 
their first lethal shells for use until April, 
1917)19 and the gas specialists were forced to 
continue using canister-released cloud attacks. 
Having no special a t tack gas personnel 
themselves, the Canadians relied on the British 
Royal Engineers Gas Specialists to release 
chlorine and phosgene from the metal canisters 
on their sectors of the front. 
The Special Companies were groups of 
trained Gas Specialists whose job was to gauge 
11 
Canadian Division shifted over to block the 
enemy, all the while launching desperate 
counterattacks. The casualties were appalling but 
the Canadians held the line as the British rushed 
up units piece-meal. 
When the Canadians were gassed on the 24th, 
some of the more a s t u t e officers, non-
commissioned officers and privates, noticing the 
green tarnish to their buttons and bayonets from 
the earlier gassing, as well as the smell and affect 
on their eyes and lungs, had surmised that the 
Germans had employed chlorine gas. As the 
green-yellow death cloud floated through the 
Canadian lines, men passed on hurried advice 
to "piss on a rag and stuff it in your mouth if you 
want to live."16 The urine reacted with the gas 
and generally protected the lungs. Those in the 
path of the cloud who covered their mouths with 
the foul rags generally survived the gassing; those 
that could not or would not, died or were severely 
disabled. 
The relentless pressure of the German 
onslaught pushed the Canadians back, forcing 
them to leave many of their wounded and almost 
all of their dead to the Germans. The afflicted 
men turned green and then black as they 
struggled to breath through their destroyed lungs. 
In addition to the physical effects, the gas attacks 
disrupted communications and induced chaos 
in the command structure. To many Canadians 
it was simply murder as chemical agents 
relentlessly swept across their positions, 
suffocating and killing men at random. It is 
difficult to put an exact figure on the number of 
gas casualties, but in addition to those many who 
suffocated outright and were left behind, more 
were killed by conventional weapons as gassed 
men flopped helplessly about, forsaking cover 
and running to the rear. Rendered senseless, 
many others were captured. Finally, there was 
no consistent attempt to count and accurately 
label those gassed men who made it off the 
battlefield, only to die in military hospitals. After 
three days of grim fighting, the 1st Division had 
lost half its fighting strength - more than 6,000 
casualties - but in return, it had made a 
reputation as an elite fighting force.17 
As the Canadians dragged themselves into 
reserve, Allied politicians and newspapers 
universally labeled the German use of gas as 
barbarous.18 Soldiers from the lowest private 
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proposed to have a gas cloud released in its 
sector which would be followed by a smoke 
attack and then a series of raiding parties. The 
raid was intricately planned and every attempt 
at realistic training and the coordination of the 
a t tacking par t ies was orches t ra ted . The 
Canadians had already learned tha t the 
dangers of night raids were numerous, and 
soldiers who were simply sent over to wreak 
havoc invariably failed with high casualties. It had 
to be a planned operation, like a miniature battle. 
Men were equipped with trench weapons like 
Mills bombs, revolvers and knives; scouts snuck 
into no-man's-land to plot hidden routes through 
the enemy wire; sentries were warned to expect 
men coming in along their front; and the artillery 
was instructed to fire box barrages to isolate the 
defenders. All of this took time and planning, 
especially for the larger raids involving hundreds 
of men in company-sized assaults. 
The introduction of poison gas to the raid 
caused some concern among front-l ine 
commanders, and complicated the already 
delicate planning. Time and time again gas 
delivered from buried metal cylinders had 
the wind, make sure all of the hoses were 
emptying gas in the right direction into no-
man's-land, and then release the gas from the 
canisters at the appropriate moment.20 The 
Specialists were generally viewed with distrust 
by the infantry who knew that once the gas 
was released, they retreated to the rear "before 
all hell broke loose."21 One regimental historian 
noted that there was always intense retaliation 
by the enemy artillery for the release of gas, 
and the infantry were less than pleased with 
its use on their front; it could also turn back 
on them in weak or suddenly reversing wind, 
as happened to the British at Loos on 25 
Sep tember 1915. 2 2 Yet the Bri t ish high 
commands continued to view gas, despite the 
infantry's apprehension and partly because 
they did not understand its limited nature, as 
a useful weapon which could be employed in 
conjunction with the infantry to achieve 
surprise tactical success. 
After being plagued by more frequent 
German gas at tacks, the Canadian Corps 
decided to retaliate on 16 January 1917. The 
8th Canadian Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division, 
12 
A gas cloud being released from canisters on the Western Front circa 1916. 
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proven to be unstable. At best it involved days 
of intense labour in bringing the 150 pound 
gas-filled canisters to the front, planting them 
beside terrified infantrymen and waiting for a 
proper wind; at worst, the canisters could be 
p u n c t u r e d by enemy shrapne l or, when 
released, unfavourable winds could turn the 
gas on the infantry waiting to go over the top. 
Despite these drawbacks, gas caused genuine 
fear and confusion in the enemy's ranks.23 
For weeks before the raid, the Canadians 
organised carrying parties of forty-eight men each 
to bring the canisters from the rear on toboggans 
and then dragged the final distance overland 
during the night to the front-line trenches.24 When 
the "rats" (as they were code-named) were 
brought into the lines, men of the Royal Engineers 
Special Companies set them into specially 
prepared "rat traps." They were buried halfway 
into the trench floor, sandbags surrounding them 
with flexible hoses attached to the nozzles and 
running into no-man's-land. They appeared 
innocuous, except of course to those men who 
had to occupy the trenches, continually praying 
that the Germans did not unleash an artillery 
strafe that might crack them open. Even if not 
burst open, the infantry knew that the use of gas 
instigated harsh retaliation. 
An uncooperative wind remained a problem. 
From 14 January onward, the weather was 
moving from east to west, against the Canadian 
lines. All soldiers were required to keep their 
small box respirators (gas masks) on their 
chests, anxiously awaiting any indication that the 
Germans might pre-empt their gas strike with 
one of their own. The delay was even more intense 
for the battle groups, each made up of two officers 
and 35 other ranks from the 4th and 5th 
Canadian Mounted Rifles, who were to go over 
the top following the gas and smoke releases. 
The carefully worked out plan called for the 
Canadian front line to increase its activity by 
firing machine guns, shooting flares and moving 
about the trenches to give the impression that 
they were nervous and anticipating a raid from 
the Germans. This was to be carried out from 
sunset to zero hour at 8 pm on 16 January. At 
zero hour the infantry were to blaze away with 
their machine guns and throw hand bombs into 
the gaps in the wire. It was hoped that this would 
impress upon the confused Germans that the 
Canadians believed they were being raided. 
Amidst this confusion and noise, the field artillery 
was to lay down a barrage on the enemy trenches 
and the heavy artillery to bombard the reserve 
areas, thereby, isolating the Germans in the 
forward zone who would head into their dugouts 
to escape the high explosive barrage. As this was 
happening a strong wind was to carry the 
simultaneously released poison gas over into the 
enemy lines to seep into their trenches. The 
artillery would continue moving back and forth 
over their position in order to cause more friction 
among the defenders and would stop only at 65 
minutes past zero. At zero plus 120 minutes a 
smoke wave would be put over by the Special 
Companies using specially designed smoke-
candles and the raiders were to follow into the 
German lines.25 
As the infantry, artillery, special companies 
and their commanders waited for a proper wind, 
minute after minute ticked away until the zero 
hour was missed. The 8th Brigade was scheduled 
to be pulled out the next morning and relieved 
by the 26th British Infantry Brigade, but clinging 
to the hope that the wind would change, the 
Canadian raiding parties were left in the line. The 
raiders were withdrawn to the reserve trenches 
after two days, but they still intended to carry 
out the operation. For two weeks the raiding 
parties were moved up the line and then back 
again as the wind remained temperamental, 
constantly changing direction or strength and 
leaving all involved thoroughly disgusted. By 4 
February the 8th Brigade was moved to a different 
sector of the front and the battle groups rejoined 
their units, having left the gas canisters to the 
British occupying that sector.26 
While the raiders were being sent up and 
back down the line, on 31 January 1917, the 
Germans released a 10 kilometre long gas cloud 
of very dense concentration and long duration 
against French units between Marquises and 
Auberive. Despite the fact that the French had 
received warnings of the impending gas attack 
and that it was delivered in daylight, they 
suffered 1,900 casualties, of which more than 
500 died.27 The disquietingly high casualties 
and the shocking lack of French anti-gas 
discipline was passed on to all Allied armies in 
the hope that such a disaster would not happen 
again. Not having received a formal report of 
the 3rd Division's stillborn raid, and impressed 
13 
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than air, poison gas sinks into low-lying 
trenches, dugouts and shellholes. Gas was an 
useful weapon for ferreting the enemy out into 
the open, but it had to reach his lines first. For 
gas to move uphill would require a very strong 
breeze and without it the gas would pollute the 
craters and depressions that pocketed the Vimy 
battlefield - the exact positions tha t the 
attackers would have to pass over to reach their 
destination. Without a forceful breeze the 
operation would be fiasco. 
The 85th Battalion took part in carrying 
hundreds of gas canisters into the trenches in 
preparation for the gas attack; its regimental 
history notes that "fifteen tons of gas was to be 
sent over to strike terror into the black heart of 
the enemy. The first wave was to be of deadly 
poisonous gas that would kill every living thing 
in its path: while the second would corrode all 
metal substances and destroy guns of every 
description. When complete all our men would 
have to do would be to walk into the enemy 
trenches, throw out their dead bodies and take 
possession."31 Such assumptions must have 
sounded fanciful to some of the veterans, but as 
this was the official line, and it accorded with 
the constant rumours that percolated at the front 
with regards to new, lethal gases being 
introduced, it is little wonder that the "poor 
bloody infantry" placed so much faith in their 
gas clearing the enemy trenches.32 
Once again the task of bringing the gas 
cylinders into the line fell to the infantry and as 
one Canadian remarked, it was "a stupendous 
job." I saw "grown, s trong men cry, j u s t 
exhausted."33 Private Owen Bingham of the 78th 
Battalion added that those frightful canisters 
required such an exertion that only about half 
the men in his battalion were able to carry them.34 
Despite the difficulty of the task, the "lunch 
baskets", as they were code-named this time, had 
been brought and set-up in the front line by the 
night of 25-26 February. It was left to the men of 
Special Gas Company "M" to give the signal when 
the wind was of the right speed and direction. 
Some had a better tactical appreciation of 
the situation and at least two of the four Battalion 
c o m m a n d e r s a rgued tha t the raid was 
imprac t ica l . L ieu tenant -Colone l A.H.G. 
Kemball, the commander of the 54th Battalion, 
objected to Brigadier-General Victor Odium, 
with the recent German gas results, the 4th 
Canadian Division resolved to incorporate gas 
into its forthcoming raid against the heights of 
Vimy.28 
After several months of trench raids gathering 
in scope and size, the 4th Division planned to 
launch the largest Canadian raid of the war to 
date. It was labeled "a reconnaissance in force,"29 
and the operation was to consist of 1,700 men 
from the 54th, 72nd, 73rd, and 75th Battalions. 
Their objective was the highest point on Vimy 
Ridge, Hill 145 (where the Vimy Memorial now 
stands), a fortified series of interlocking machine-
gun nests, wire belts and deep dugouts. The 
danger and complexities of attacking up-hill 
where the Germans would have the advantages 
of their fixed defences as well as the heights, when 
combined with the difficulty of accurately laying 
down counter-battery fire on the enemy guns, 
resulted in the plan being conceived as a surprise 
attack. Because of the strong defensive position, 
it was necessary that poison gas smother the 
enemy before he realised what was occurring. 
The conception was flawed from the start and 
the division's staff officers planning the raid had 
little understanding of how chemical agents 
worked in battlefield realities. Ever since the 
British disaster at Loos in 1915, canister-
released gas clouds were seen as a fickle weapon, 
to be used only by specialists who were seen more 
as chemists than soldiers. There was simply very 
little understanding of this weapon by senior 
commanders, who hoped that any release of gas 
would emulate the first gassing at 2nd Ypres 
when two whole divisions were routed. Although 
gas was still a fearful weapon, better anti-gas 
discipline and respirators ensured that no such 
rout would occur again.30 Equally detrimental, 
the staff officers and commanders had neglected 
training their soldiers in any doctrine - or set of 
common accepted instructions or guidelines -
about how to work with this weapon. Yet, because 
of the formidable position of the Germans on 
Vimy, gas was needed for the very reason that 
other more conventional weapons could not 
guarantee success. Gas was not the weapon of 
choice, but of desperation. Ill-placed faith created 
de lus ions which outweighed all logical 
assumptions. 
Moreover, the heights of Vimy were ill-
suited for a gas cloud release. Being heavier 
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Examples of gas masks. Above, a soldier adjusts his 
comrade's gas mask; Right: an early style gas helmet. 
commander of the 11th Brigade, that because 
of the unpredictable wind, the raid should be 
postponed and more artillery fire brought to bear 
on the German lines. Equally concerned, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sam Beckett, the commander 
of the 75th Battalion, believed that not only was 
the surprise attack no longer a secret, but that 
his troops had no training with gas. Aware that 
two of his experienced and decorated battalion 
commanders were unhappy with the plan, 
Odium, long a veteran and accomplished planner 
of raids himself, questioned his orders by writing 
to and then strenuously arguing with General 
Staff Officer 1 (the highest staff position in the 
division) Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund Ironside. 
His central concern was that if the gas failed how 
were his men to get across no-man's-land before 
the enemy barrage opened up?35 Ironside, a 
future Chief of the Imperial General Staff, refused 
to entertain ideas about postponement - too 
much planning and hope were riding on the 
raid. Their objections overruled, the attack 
groups were moved to the front to prepare for 
the assault. Despite the fact that commanders 
never accompanied raiders, both Kemball and 
Beckett refused to send their men into the 
questionable battle without leading them from 
the front. In the end, two experienced battalion 
commanders, who had scouted the area and 
seen the formidable defences their men were 
up against, were ignored by staff officers willing 
to rely on a super -weapon to overcome 
defenders who had spent two years fortifying 
their position. 
As the men of the 4th Division lay in the 
cold mud, nerves taut, waiting in anticipation 
for the opening barrage to begin, the soldiers 
of the four attacking battalions cursed the 
weather, the Germans and probably the Gas 
Specialists as the wind remained too light or 
blowing in the wrong direction for a canister 
gas release. The frustration began to mount 
as the intricate raid was postponed again and 
again. Staff officers began to wonder if the 
surprise of both the raid and the use of gas 
had been lost; officers and men at the front 
knew for sure as the German defenders 
shouted taunts to the Canadians to come over 
the top.36 
In addition to the psychological pressure 
of repeated postponements, the waiting also 
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Germans out of their dugouts, and because the 
artillery fire from Canadian guns was "not 
sufficiently concentrated and caused no 
slackening of enemy fire," that is where they 
remained - in position and manning their 
fortified trenches.44 
The raiders were to go into no-man's-land at 
0540, forty minutes after a second discharge of 
gas. But minutes before the second gas cloud was 
to be released, the wind changed and it could 
not be liberated. In the 12th Brigade sector, 
however, the message was not received and, when 
the gas was released, it slowly moved up the ridge 
only to stop and begin to float back towards the 
Canadian lines, eventually drifting through the 
waiting soldiers of the 11th Brigade on the left.45 
A private from the 102nd Battalion, Maurice 
Bracewell, remembered the terror as the gas 
turned and seeped back into the Canadian lines: 
"Our front lines got all the gas, the front trenches 
were saturated with it."46 Although the gas 
casualties suffered by Canadians were not 
recorded in the confusion, they were probably 
not heavy considering most men were equipped 
with the very effective Small Box Respirator. 
Because the gas was so dense in some areas, the 
raiding parties, most from the 73rd Battalion, 
were forced to leave their trenches, suffering 
additional casualties from shell and bullet, as 
they proceeded overland until they found their 
assembly points.47 
Mistakenly thinking that the second gas 
attack had blown through the German ranks, one 
officer of the 50th Battalion, whose unit was 
acting as a reserve on the flank of the 75th 
Battalion, believed the orders passed down from 
higher commands that our comrades "were just 
going to jump over the top and pick up all these 
gassed Germans." When he looked across the two 
hundred and fifty yards of no-man's-land, just 
minutes before the first wave of 75th Battalion 
men were to go over, he was shocked to see the 
Germans tightly packed in their trenches, 
bayoneted rifles aimed at the Canadian lines.48 
The Canadian raiders, already committed to 
battle and spurred on by their earlier raiding 
success, persevered in the hope that the 
Germans had been sufficiently overcome by the 
first wave of gas. They were not. 
took its toll physically; for example, the 12th 
Brigade lost three killed and 22 wounded from 
s t r ay shel l ing on 26 Februa ry alone.3 7 
Moreover, during the delay, at least one 
German artillery barrage "searching" the 
C a n a d i a n front p u n c t u r e d some of the 
canisters. A sentry noticed the gas and awoke 
his platoon, but fearing to alert the Germans 
he did not raise a gas alarm. Word was quietly 
passed along the trenches, but it failed to reach 
a small group of infantrymen in the path of 
the wayward cloud - all were poisoned and one 
man suffocated to death.38 The Canadians were 
learning the hard way that employing infantry 
and gas together in an attack was a dangerous 
p ropos i t ion . Still, the p lan remained 
unchanged and the raiders were to follow 
behind the second of two gas clouds into the 
German trenches. It was the second gas cloud 
which was to seal the German's fate, as it was 
planned to catch many of them unprepared, 
exhausted and lethargic from their ordeal with 
the first cloud less than two hours earlier. 
At last the wait ended when the British gas 
specialists indicated there was proper wind 
strength on the last night of February 1917.39 At 
3 a.m. on 1 March, the Special Companies' Gas 
Sergeants , wearing red, white and green 
brassards to indicate to the Canadian infantry 
who they were, released 1,038 cylinders of White 
Star (chlorine and phosgene) gas into a stiff 
breeze of 9 miles per hour, which carried it 
quickly over to the German lines.40 Unfortunately 
for the Canadians, the German defenders had 
only recently been issued new orders to combat 
gas cloud releases: "As soon as the alarm is given 
shoot up red and green flares. Our artillery will 
fire into the gas cloud and on the hostile 
trenches."41 True to orders, the German counter-
bar rage fell on the Canad ian lines and 
immediately punctured several canisters holding 
phosgene for the second wave release, gassing 
groups of Canadians and gas specialists. It did 
nothing to raise the infantry's impression of their 
special weapon.42 
Messages sent back to the 4th Division 
Headquarters by forward observers noted that 
the Germans, adopting the new gas defence, 
immediately fired red SOS flares and kept their 
rifle fire "fairly regular" until the gas had moved 
past their lines.43 The use of gas had brought the 
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for help, only to watch a bullet shatter his skull 
and splatter brain and blood over him.51 Still 
the Canadians rushed on, advancing through 
cra te rs and over fallen comrades . J a c k 
Quinnell, like the rest of the Canadians caught 
within the withering barrage of metal, skirted 
shellhole after shellhole as he attempted to 
draw closer to the German line. Popping into a 
crater already occupied by one of his officers, 
the man turned to him and shouted, "I'm going 
to make a run for it; you can do what you like." 
At zero hour the Canadians went "over the bags" and were met by withering fire. The 
two Battalion Commanders were killed while 
leading their men in the charge: Kemball of the 
54th Battalion was riddled with bullets as he 
searched for an opening through the German 
wire, his body caught on the spooled rolls like 
some macabre scarecrow; Sam Beckett, at the 
head of his troops as they scrambled across 
the fire zone, was shot through the heart by a 
sniper. Because it was expected that the gas 
He rose and stumbled off, promptly taken down 
by a bullet. The wild dash across no-man's-
land was the last for many Canadians that day 
as enemy fire, poison gas and even Canadian 
shells falling short, left bodies strewn over no-
man's-land. 
The Canad ian gas cloud vapour s to 
shel lholes in n o - m a n ' s - l a n d and was 
strengthened when the Germans fired gas 
shells into the Canadian assembly trenches 
forcing the raiders to don their respirators, 
which reduced visibility and made it more 
difficult to breath as they desperately sought 
gaps in the wire.52 In spite of all obstacles, a 
group of Canadians cleared a 500-yard section 
of the German trench in hand-to-hand fighting. 
The general breakdown of the assault meant 
the surviving C a n a d i a n s from all four 
battalions were forced into a running battle in 
the German trenches. Cut off from their own 
lines by counterattacks, the Canadian infantry 
17 
would silence the enemy, white flags had been 
set up to mark the gaps in the wire. These now 
drew the Canadians into natural killing zones 
as German machine-gunners aimed at these 
hard-to-miss targets.49 Scores of Canadians 
were mowed down as they struggled through 
the wire of no-man's-land. In less than five 
bloody minutes, the 54th Battalion alone lost 
its Commanding Officer, two of the four 
Company Commanders killed (the other two 
injured) and close to 190 men, remembered 
Sergeant Major Alex Jack .50 
The futile assaul t degenerated into a 
cha rne l house , b u t t h r o u g h o u t i t the 
Canadians displayed their reputat ion for 
dogged tenacity which they had won on earlier 
battlefields. It was a grim time nonetheless as 
friends and companions who had survived the 
horrors of the Somme were cut down in swaths. 
Caught on some wire in no-man 's - land, 
Signaller Stanley Baker turned to his partner 
Canadians soldiers advancing across no-man's-land. 
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German officer rose above his parapet with a 
white flag and walked into no-man's-land 
where he offered the Canadians a respite to 
collect their wounded and dead. Several 
Germans also helped to gather a number of 
the slain which were deposited near the 
Canadian lines. One of the 43 corpses was 
Colonel Kemball, who was peeled off the 
German wire and returned with honours. At a 
prearranged time the hostilities continued at 
0815 hours on 3 March.56 
When the roll was called the next day, the full extent of the disaster became known; the 
four attacking battalions suffered 687 casualties 
- a 43 percent casualty rate.67 Those men who 
were not too numb with exhaustion began to 
question the whole raid. The War Diary of the 
54th critically remarked that the "first discharge 
of gas apparently had no effect on the enemy," 
but more importantly, the question arises as to 
why they would have thought any differently.58 
Both the Canadians and Germans were equipped 
with very good gas masks by this point in the 
war, which made the use of canistered gas almost 
useless unless employed against poorly trained 
or surprised opponents.59 The distance of 200 
to 250 yards between the lines meant that the 
enemy had between one and two minutes before 
the gas reached them. That was certainly enough 
time to don respirators, especially if they were 
aware of the possible use of gas. The series of 
delays, when combined with German intelligence 
gathered from raids and simple observation, had 
already eliminated the surprise factor. It is clear, 
however, that both Ironside and Watson were 
unwilling to call off the long-awaited raid. Gas 
was a weapon which was supposed to have made 
the raid a walk-over, and instead its use led to 
one of the worst disasters of the war for the 
Canadian Corps. As Stanley Baker of the 54th 
Battalion bitterly remembered, he knew little of 
gas before the battle, but by the end he "knew 
what it tasted like."60 
If gas was despised by the front-line troops, 
it was now also universally condemned by the 
commanders in the rear. In an after -battle report, 
Brigadier-General J.H. McBrien, commander of 
the 12th Brigade, noted tha t the initial 
"discharge brought the enemy up out of his 
dugouts and made him suspect and prepare 
to resist an attack or raid."61 His equal, the 
were virtually surrounded until a successful 
break-out by several officers allowed dozens of 
men to escape. But, as one trench warrior 
observed, "we had very heavy casualt ies, 
especially among the officers."53 
Those soldiers wounded in no-man's-land 
crawled to shellholes for safety and in the process 
often fell victim to their own gas which had 
pooled in the mucky depressions. Stuck in a 
crater while the Germans sniped anything that 
moved, Stanley Baker remembered watching 
the men in his large hole slowly being killed as 
exposed heads and backs were blasted by 
sharpshooters. Employing one of the Canadian 
corpses for cover he used his helmet to dig a 
shallow trench to reach another hole in the 
rear. The lingering gases made him cry and 
vomit, but he finally wormed his way back to 
the Canadian line later that night.54 In the 
chaos of the batt le, with smoke and fire 
obscuring vision, gas masks clouding up and 
reducing the intake of breath, many of the 
soldiers removed their respirators for periods 
of time. Many were overcome by gas. Those who 
did not quickly escape their shellholes never 
left. 
Those who were not suffocated by their own 
gas cried out piteously all night, their voices rising 
and falling in shrieks and moans, but always 
carrying over the battlefield. One final tragedy 
occurred when several wounded men were 
trapped in a series of shellholes near the 
Canadian lines by German snipers. An officer 
called down an artillery barrage on the German 
positions to give some cover to get the wounded 
in, but once again the fire was short and many of 
those men were annihilated by their own shells 
before the guns were frantically called off.55 
Although danger remained from snipers and 
stray shells, several Canadians who could not 
stand leaving their companions behind slipped 
over their own parapet to locate victims and drag 
them into the lines. Dozens of men were later 
found in gas-infected shellholes covered in 
yellowish bile as they uncont ro l lab ly 
discharged pints of liquid from their lungs. The 
gurgling of companions' last breaths through 
corrupted airways was a memory that haunted 
many survivors for the rest of their lives. 
The ghastly carpet of Canadians that 
covered much of the battlefield was so 
disturbing that, on the morning of the 2nd, a 
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Brigadier-General Victor Odium (holding rifle), 
commander of 11th Infantry Brigade. 
commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade, Victor 
Odium, was more emphatic and raged that the 
infantry should never have been sent over, for 
it was obvious with the rifle fire coming from 
the German lines that the defenders had not 
been incapac i t a t ed by the gas . 6 2 Their 
commander, Major-General David Watson, 
echoed his brigadiers, and later wrote that "gas 
was overestimated, and too much reliance was 
therefore placed on it."63 The Canadians had 
honed their raiding skills during the last two 
years, but they had no idea how to integrate 
poison gas into that type of warfare, the exact 
operation that should have been investigated 
and studied by Ironside and Watson. Such 
reflections were correct concerning the limited 
usefulness of gas clouds as tactical weapons, 
b u t t h a t did lit t le for the h u n d r e d s of 
Canadians rotting on the battlefield. 
Gas remained a very useful weapon when 
employed properly, but the infantry hoped to 
never see the vile stuff again. As the war 
progressed, so too did the use of poison gas, until 
by 1918 it daily plagued the soldiers on the 
battlefields of the Western Front.64 Learning from 
the debacle, the Canadians decided, and rightly 
so, against combining gas released from cylinders 
and infantry attacks for the rest of the war. 
Starting at the Battle for Vimy Ridge in April 
1917, gas shells were increasingly used in 
barrages and counter-battery work to accomplish 
a variety of tactical missions and eventually 
became an integral component of the fireplans 
for 1918. 
Meanwhile, for Sergeant-Major Alex Jack the raid remained, "a nightmare, [an] absolute 
nightmare of a raid.. .which very much weakened 
[the division] when Vimy came along."65 In that 
historic battle five weeks later, the soldiers of the 
4th were once again tasked to capture the same 
position. The 4th was the only division not to 
take all of its objectives on 9 April. Having its 
best men and most experienced officers 
machine-gunned and suffocated to death in the 
aborted raid had destroyed the fighting 
efficiency of the division, which required many 
months of restaffing and intensive training to 
regain its form. In addition to four battalions 
being physically decimated, the morale of the 
division was nearly shattered.66 Faith in all 
commanders was only barely redeemed by the 
bravery exhibited by front-line officers during 
the heat of battle. Whatever General Watson 
thought the implications of his division 
suffering a crippling reversal to be, his personal 
diary contained no clues and very few entries. 
His only explanation for the failure of the raid 
was that "the front trenches [were] too far 
apart. " He had no comments on faulty staff 
work. Infantry survivors like Maurice Bracewell 
real ised tha t someth ing far graver had 
occurred.67 
The 4th Division's gas raid was the single 
most self-destructive Canadian raid of the war. 
It not only temporarily impaired the fighting 
efficiency of the 4th Division, but called into 
question the whole policy of raiding. The most 
experienced Canadian divisional commander, 
Arthur Currie, who was soon to be appointed 
corps commander, had forbidden uncontrolled 
raiding in the months prior to the Battle of Vimy 
Ridge. After a study of the after-battle reports, 
he noted that the results generally did not bear 
out the casualties to the at tackers . More 
detrimental, it was the best men of the units -
the junior officers, NCOs and other ranks - who 
were generally lost. When necessary, Currie 
ordered raids to be carried out, but he certainly 
did not endorse such raids for the simple sake 
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Such an analysis might go some way to 
explaining the extent to which Canadian success 
was based on technology, doctrinal and tactical 
innovations, the good morale of the soldiers, 
on the structure and size of formations, or the 
influence of individual commanders. 
The spiralling policy of raiding had begun to 
get out of hand in the months prior to the assault 
on Vimy Ridge. The harsh rebuke of the Gas Raid 
of 1 March 1917, happened time and time again 
to those who had begun to expect results rather 
than carefully plan for them. As a result, the 
Canadians learned from their mistakes and 
returned to the basics of war-fighting. Byng's 
policy was to train every soldier to know all 
aspects of the battlefield and his expected 
role. The Gas Raid was a powerful lesson which 
drove officers and soldiers to hone their hard-
won skills in order to never repeat such a 
disaster.71 When the Canadians went "over the 
top" at Vimy, they would not be blind cattle 
mounting the slaughterhouse ramp like the men 
of the 4th Division five weeks earlier; they were 
to be thinking soldiers, whose commanders 
relied on the ever-refined doctrine of soldiers 
leaning into massive artillery barrages, rather 
than a nebulous gas cloud. 
of keeping men busy.68 Watson's failure to 
understand this must surely place him, as 
some of his junior officers noted, in the second 
echelon of Canadian commanders. Although 
few have tried to analyse Watson or most of 
the other Canadian divisional commanders, it 
seems that he did not share Currie's strong 
will or desire for intricate planning. Perhaps it 
was a case, as one junior officer remarked, that 
"his personality was rather put in the shade 
by that of his General Staff Officer Grade I -
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Ironside. The general 
opinion was tha t Ironside was the real 
commander of the division."69 Although 
overshadowed by the towering Ironside, with 
more experience Watson learned from his 
mistakes - perhaps by more closely following 
Byng and later Currie's direction. Nonetheless, 
neither Watson nor Ironside, despite being 
experienced in trench fighting, exhibited good 
judgement in their planning - a fault that can 
be direct ly a t t r i b u t e d to thei r lack of 
understanding and failure to devise a doctrine 
for poison gas. Despite an initial foray into the 
topic, more work needs to be done on Watson 
and all the divisional commanders in order to 
ascertain their influence on each of the four 
divisions and the Canadian Corps in general.70 
20 
Canadian stretcher-bearers, wearing gas masks, bring in Canadian wounded. 
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the occupation of Mons on 11 November 1918, 
clearly marked the Canadian Corps as one of the 
finest fighting formations on the Western Front. 
With the Australian Corps, it was perceived as 
the spearhead of the British Expeditionary Force. 
But before it earned that designation, the Corps 
learned the hard way, the Western Front way, that 
success was often bought with the blood of 
previous failures. 
The Germans and their commanders might 
have been caught at Vimy Ridge in April 1917 
with a smug attitude. After all, they had easily 
repulsed units of the 4th Division less than a 
month before, and here again were those same 
British colonials trying to overcome another, 
larger, nearly impregnable fortress. Perhaps the 
Canadian reputation, forged in the big battles and 
t r ench ra ids of 1915-1916 , had been 
exaggerated? As Vimy showed, perhaps not. 
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